Tyranny of the Majority

The ‘evil pleasures’ criticism of utilitarianism is that not all pleasures are good.

 

Consider the example of torture. Sandra experiences pleasure when she causes physical harm to other people against their will (torture). We can easily imagine instances where the amount of pleasure that Sandra experiences outweighs the pain experienced by the person she is hurting. In this case, it seems that the utilitarian must accept that Sandra is not doing anything morally wrong by torturing the person. In fact, torture, at least in this case, is actually morally good. Yet for many people, it seems intuitively wrong to say that torture is morally justified, regardless of how much pleasure is generated.

 

Here’s another example. Thomas experiences pleasure when he makes up false and malicious rumours about his friend Phillip. Thomas derives great pleasure from spreading these rumours but Phillip isn’t upset by silly gossip and is not not harmed by it. In this case, the pleasure that Thomas experiences outweighs any suffering experienced by Phillip, but it seems counterintuitive to say that Thomas’ pleasure is good.

 

Remember that a key part of utilitarianism is the hedonic principle, which states that pleasure is the only intrinsic good (the only thing that is good for its own sake). So everything that you think of as being ‘good’, is good just because of the pleasure it produces. If we accept that all pleasure is good, then we must accept that the pleasure generated from ‘evil’ actions is also good.

 

How can a utilitarian reply to the ‘evil pleasures’ criticism? First they might bite the bullet and accept that in these cases, Sandra and Thomas have not done anything morally wrong. However, as we’ve said, this seems counterintuitive because it seems like there is something about deriving pleasure from another’s pain that just is wrong. This greatly undermines the appeal of utilitarianism. A better option might be to say actions should not be judged individually. So instead of asking whether torture or spreading rumours may increase net happiness in certain circumstances (which it might), we should ask whether torture or spreading rumours would maximise happiness if everyone tried to secure pleasure this way. In this case, the answer would clearly be no because torture and gossip practiced more generally would produce more pain than pleasure. This allows the utilitarian to say that torture and spreading malicious gossip should be avoided because they tend to produce more pain than pleasure.